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Abstract
Digital identities represent who we are when engaging in
online activities and transactions. The rapid growth in the
number of online services leads to in an increasing num-
ber of different identities that each user needs to manage.
As a result, many people feel overloaded with identities
and suffer from password fatigue. This is a serious prob-
lem and makes people unable properly control and pro-
tect their digital identities against identity theft. This pa-
per discusses the usability and privacy in online identity
management solutions, and proposed a general approach
for making users better able to control and manage their
digital identities, as well as for creating more secure iden-
tity management solutions. More specically, we propose
a user-centric approach based on hardware and software
technology on the user-side with the aim of assisting users
when accessing online services.
Keywords: Identity management, user-centric, security,
usability, privacy, federation
1 Introduction
An identity is a representation of an entity in a specic
domain. An identity is normally only associated with a
single entity. Shared identities may exist in some sense,
for example a family identity that corresponds to several
people in a family unit. However, as far as the service
provider is concerned, it is dealing with one real world
entity (the family). An entity may have several identities
within a given domain. For example, a person may be
both a parent and a teacher in a school, and thereby have
two identities in the school system. The rules for register-
ing identities within a domain determines whether multi-
ple identities for one entity are permitted. Even if forbid-
den, multiple identities for the same entity may still occur
in the system, e.g. in error or because of fraud. An entity
can have different identities in different domains. For ex-
ample, a person may have one identity as a bank customer
and another identity as a company employee.
An identity consists of a set of characteristics and at-
tributes, which are called identiers when used for iden-
tication purposes. These characteristics can have vari-
Copyright c©2007, Australian Computer Society, Inc. This paper ap-
peared at the Australasian Information Security Workshop: Privacy En-
hancing Technologies (AISW 2007), Ballarat, Australia, 2007. Confer-
ences in Research and Practice in Information Technology (CRPIT), Vol.
68. Ljiljana Brankovic, Paul Coddington, John F. Roddick, Chris Steke-
tee, Jim Warren, and Andrew Wendelborn, Eds. Reproduction for aca-
demic, not-for profit purposes permitted provided this text is included.
ous properties, such as being transient or permanent, self-
selected or issued by an authority, suitable for human in-
terpretation or only by computers. The possible charac-
teristics of an identity may differ, depending on the type
of real world entity being identied. For example, gender
applies to people, but not to organisations; a national com-
pany registration number applies to a company, but not to
a person.
It should be noted that the separation between identity
and identier is blurred in common language. The term
identity is often used in the sense of identier, espe-
cially when an identity is recognised by a single unique
identier within a given context. For clarity, the terms
identity and identier will be used with their separate
specic meanings throughout this paper.
A digital identity can be dened as the identity result-
ing from the digital codication of characteristics and at-
tributes in a way that is suitable for processing by com-
puter systems.
Identity management in computer networks is com-
monly described as the combination of technologies and
practices for representing and recognising entities as digi-
tal identities.
A problem with many identity management systems
is that they are designed to be cost effective and scal-
able from the perspective of the service provider (denoted
SP hereafter), which sometimes creates inconvenience and
poor usability from the consumers’ perspective.
In addition to being SP-centric, traditional identity
management systems have largely ignored that it is often
equally important for consumers to be able to authenticate
SPs, as it is for SPs to authenticate consumers.
There is a clear asymmetry between user identity man-
agement and SP identity management. In the case of
online service provision through the Web, user authen-
tication typically takes place on the application layer,
whereas SP authentication takes place on the transport
layer through the SSL 1 protocol.
This paper focuses on the usability and privacy as-
pects of identity management solutions. We will show
that some identity models naturally provide better usabil-
ity and privacy protection, whereas others inherently will
expose personal information to third parties that are un-
related to the user-SP relationship. We describe a user-
centric approach to identity management, which in our
view has superior usability and privacy protection charac-
teristics compared with other models. Our approach was
previously described in [1].
1Secure Sockets Layer, which is also known as the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) in recent Internet standards.
2 Principles of Security Usability
Usability of security is an extremely important, but still
poorly understood, element of IT security. An early ex-
perimental study is described in [2]. Below we will dene
some formal security usability principles.
Direct user involvement in a security service is often
required, and a distinction can be made between two types
of involvement.
• A security action is when users are required to pro-
duce information and security tokens, or to trigger
some security relevant mechanism. For example,
typing and submitting a password is a security action.
• A security conclusion is when users observe and as-
sess some security relevant evidence in order to de-
rive the security state of systems. For example, ob-
serving a closed padlock on a browser, and conclud-
ing that the communication is protected by SSL is a
security conclusion.
Usability principles related to security actions and security
conclusions are described below.
1. Security Action Usability Principles
(a) The users must understand which security ac-
tions are required of them.
(b) The users must have sufcient knowledge and
the practical ability to make the correct security
action.
(c) The mental and physical load of a security ac-
tion must be tolerable.
(d) The mental and physical load of making re-
peated security actions for any practical number
of transactions must be tolerable.
2. Security Conclusion Usability Principles
(a) The user must understand the security conclu-
sion that is required for making an informed de-
cision. This means that users must understand
what is required of them to support a secure
transaction.
(b) The system must provide the user with suf-
cient information for deriving the security con-
clusion. This means that it must be logically
possible to derive the security conclusion from
the information provided.
(c) The mental load of deriving the security con-
clusion must be tolerable.
(d) The mental load of deriving security conclu-
sions for any practical number of service access
instances must be tolerable.
Although SSL uses strong cryptography, it is for ex-
ample unable to protect against phishing attacks. This
fraudulent practice is perpetrated by attackers posing, for
example, as online banks and sending out spam email to
people asking them to log on to false, but genuine looking
Web sites, which allows the attackers to phish identiers
and passwords from unsuspecting users. The problem is
not to due to weak authentication mechanisms, but is due
to poor usability of the overall Web security solution, of
which SSL is only a small part [3]. By comparing the
security solution with the security usability principles de-
scribed above, it can easily be seen why the security fails.
The closed padlock does for example not give suf-
cient evidence to logically derive the security conclusion
of knowing the identity of the SP (violation of security
usability principle 2b).
If the user chooses to view the server certicate, the
mental load of analysing its content is intolerable (viola-
tion of security usability principle 2c).
Depending on the user, it is also doubtful whether
many users actually understand what security conclusion
they are supposed to make (violation of security usability
principle 2a).
This example shows that improved usability, not
strengthened cryptography, is needed in order to
strengthen users’ ability to authenticate SPs in Web inter-
actions.
3 Principles of Online Privacy Protection
Identity management plays a key role for privacy protec-
tion, because by denition a digital identity consists of
personal information.
Public surveys indicate that privacy is the major con-
cern for people using the Internet [4]. Privacy related com-
plaints that are made to the US Federal Trade Commission
include complaints about unsolicited email, identity theft,
harassing phone calls, and selling of data to third parties.
A wide array of privacy protection instruments can be
used, but none of them will provide adequate protection in
isolation.
Legislation of privacy rights has been the main instru-
ment in Europe, but has received much weaker support
elsewhere in the world [5].
One attempt to address privacy concerns based on tech-
nology is the W3C’s Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P) Project [6]. P3P enables Web sites to express their
privacy practices in a standardised, XML-based, format
that can be automatically interpreted by user agents such
as a Web browser. The aim is that discrepancies between
a site’s practices and the user’s preferences can be auto-
matically agged. P3P is unable to guarantee or enforce
the privacy claims made by Web sites, and has in general
received little acceptance in the marketplace.
While it seems that users can not rely on legislation,
nor on specic privacy protection technologies such as
P3P, users must always practice caution when exposing
their personal information. We dene the following fun-
damental user-centric privacy protection principle:
• Exposure of personal information must be min-
imised.
With relation to identity management solutions, this
means that as few parties as possible should be involved
in the management of identities used for online service ac-
cess. The various identity management models described
below will be judged against this principle.
4 Existing User Identity Management Models
We will briey go through existing identity models for
managing user identities. Each model will be illustrated
from the perspective of usability and scalability. This is
done by showing how a user can request services from
different SPs in each model. The diagrams and explana-
tions represent a very high level of abstraction, meaning
that the many details of each communication protocol and
message are omitted. The diagrams are still sufciently
detailed to show the important aspects of each model from
the user perspective.
The diagrams focus in the issuance and management
of identiers and authentication tokens, and explicitly in-
dicate who the identity providers (IdP) and the authentica-
tion token providers are. The diagram also shows where
the actual authentication takes place.
The various identity management models described
below will also be judged against the security usability
principles of Sec.2 and the privacy principle of Sec.3.
4.1 The Silo Model
In the silo model2, the SP manages the name space and au-
thentication tokens for all its users, and therefore takes the
role of IdP. The SP also authenticates users based on their
identier-token pairs during service access. Users can be
allowed to dened their own identiers, as long as they are
unique within the name space. Users can also dene their
authentication tokens such as setting the password. This
model is illustrated in Fig.1.
The symbol explanations provided by the legend in
Fig.1 also apply to subsequent gures whenever relevant.
Figure 1: Silo user identity domains
The advantage of this model is that it is simple to de-
ploy for the SPs, and that it exposes personal information
only to the SP.
The disadvantage is that it causes identity overload and
password fatigue for users when they access services from
2Called the “isolated user identity model” in [1]
many different SPs. This violates security usability prin-
ciple 1d and is illustrated by the multiple login requests
originating from the user in Fig.1.
Users routinely forget passwords to infrequently used
SPs. Forgotten passwords or fear of forgetting them cre-
ate a signicant barrier to usage, resulting in the services
not reaching their full potential. For important sensitive
services, where password recovery must be highly se-
cure, forgotten passwords can also signicantly increase
the cost of service provision.
4.2 The Common Identity Domain Model
In the common identity domain model, a central author-
ity acts as IdP and manages identiers and authentication
tokens, but does not authenticate users during service ac-
cess. All SPs will identify a specic user based on the
same unique identier from the common name space. The
associated authentication token will normally be a public-
key certicate. This is illustrated in Fig.2.
Figure 2: Common user identity domain
The advantage of this model is that it is simple to man-
age from both the SP and the user perspective. The user
only needs to manage a single identier-token pair.
The main disadvantage is that it is practically and po-
litically impossible to dene and manage a stable unique
name space for all users worldwide. Email addresses rep-
resent an example of a global name space of identiers.
Although email addresses are unique, they are not stable,
and many people will have several email addresses. Other
nationwide unique name spaces such as e.g. social secu-
rity numbers are also unsuitable for privacy reasons.
Although users do not need to expose personal infor-
mation to other parties than the SP, the common unique
identier allows different SPs to match personal informa-
tion about the same user, which represents a privacy threat.
Practical implementations of this model would need
too be based on users having public-key certicates, so
that a globally accepted PKI would be needed for manag-
ing these certicates.
4.3 The Centralised SSO Identity Model
As the name indicates, the centralised SSO is used to pro-
vide SSO (Single-Sign-On). A single authority manages
the name space, issues authentication tokens, and authen-
ticates users during service access. The central authority
then sends a security assertion to the SP, either directly as
illustrated in Fig.3, or indirectly via the client machine.
Figure 3: Centralised user identity domain
The advantage of this model is that it provides good us-
ability through SSO. It is well suited for closed networks
where multiple SPs are managed by the same organisation,
such as in universities, governments and large companies.
In closed networks the IdP and the SPs are assumed to be
governed by the same authority under a single policy. Au-
thentication networks based on Kerberos and Active Di-
rectory are good examples of how organisations can ef-
ciently implement SSO within their corporate networks.
The disadvantage is that it is not suitable for implemen-
tation in open environments where SPs are not governed
by a common policy and authority. In fact, it is very un-
likely that SPs will accept a single IdP to manage identities
and do user authenticate on their behalf. It would violate
the user-centric privacy protection principle of minimising
exposure of personal information. Ideally the centralised
IdP should not have access to personal information.
As an example of a centralised SSO for the open global
Internet, the Passport authentication service was intro-
duced by Microsoft in 1999. The idea was that users
would get a single, convenient method for identifying
themselves across different Web sites, and thereby stim-
ulate convenient e-commerce transactions. Using Pass-
port, users would entrust Microsoft to centrally hold their
personal information - such as credit card numbers -
and make it available to e-commerce websites whenever
needed.
However, the market reaction was negative, and Mi-
crosoft acknowledged that “... no single organization, not
even one as big as Microsoft, could act as the sole identity
provider for everything on the Internet.” [7]. The Pass-
port service was renamed to Windows Live ID in 2006,
and currently operates as authentication server for online
services controlled by Microsoft such as Hotmail.
From a privacy perspective, the Passport service gave
Microsoft signicant power to abuse the personal infor-
mation it collects, and clearly violated the user-centric pri-
vacy principle.
4.4 The Centralised Model with Browser Support
In response to the failed attempt to get the Passport service
accepted by the whole Internet, and in order to leverage
the existing Windows Live ID service (formerly known as
Passport), Microsoft is planning to introduce a software
and network architecture called InfoCard, where multi-
ple independent IdPs can provide authentication services
for e-commerce, and where Windows Live ID simply will
be one of multiple such IdPs. The architecture is based
on a software module called CardSpace which will be in-
tegrated with Internet Explorer 7, planned for release in
2007.
CardSpace [7] provides a storage repository for dif-
ferent identities called InfoCards, that a user might want
to use in different situations. For example, a user might
want to use different identities when contributing to on-
line blogs, and when purchasing air tickets online. The
InfoCards stored in CardSpace on the computer will not
contain sensitive information, such as login passwords or
credit card information. Each InfoCard points to a cen-
tralised IdP where the sensitive information is stored. The
IdP will be directly involved in the communication each
time a user accesses an online service that requires iden-
tity. For example, in the case of accessing an online
blog, the IdP can provide a security assertion containing
an anonymous login identier and a password, and in case
of purchasing air tickets, the IdP can provide a security as-
sertion containing real name and credit card information.
The security assertions are rst sent from the IdP to the
CardSpace module, and then forwarded to the SPs. There
is thus no direct communication between IdP and SP. This
architecture is illustrated in Fig.4. Other browser vendors
can implement software modules similar to CardSpace in
order to support this architecture, and in that sense the ar-
chitecture itself is not proprietary.
Figure 4: Multiple centralised identity domains
The advantage of having browser support for the cen-
tralised model is that it can be simpler for users to access
SPs that require identity. By supporting multiple IdPs and
multiple centralised domains, the problem of having a sin-
gle monopoly IdP is diminished.
The main disadvantage of that this is still a centralised
model, and that it is unlikely that the market will ac-
cept this model any more than they accepted the Passport
model. The only difference is that there are multiple IdPs
instead of a single IdP. According to Kim Cameron, iden-
tity model architect at Microsoft, “... online SPs did not
see what Passport had to do between them and their cus-
tomers” [8]. However, the same applies to any third party
IdP. Online SPs will resist an architecture that lets a third
party IdP authenticate their users and manage the users’
identities unless there is a very close relationship between
the SPs and the IdP. From a privacy perspective, it is unac-
ceptable to entrust third parties with personal information
when they have no direct involvement in the relationship
between the user and the SP. The only realistic usage of
this model is to allow closely related SPs, such as when
belonging to the same organisation, to outsource the iden-
tity management to a common IdP.
Another problem with having multiple centralised do-
mains is that it does not solve the scalability problem for
the users. By assuming that multiple centralised identity
domains will exist, a user will most likely access SPs from
different domains, and will therefore have to authenticate
with multiple IdPs. The problem of password fatigue will
thus remain, illustrated by the multiple login requests orig-
inating from the user to different domains in Fig.4, and
this violates security usability principle 1d. This is thus a
model that can provide SSO within one identity domain,
but not across multiple domains.
A fundamental problem with introducing software
modules for identity management such as CardSpace on
the client platform is that its security relies on the in-
herent security of the platform. It is generally accepted
that standard computing platforms such as Windows and
Linux are relatively simple to compromise, and therefore
unsuitable for sensitive transactions. By storing InfoCards
with pointers to IdPs on the platform, the potential dam-
age caused by a compromised platform is amplied dra-
matically. An attacker can steal authentication tokens for
accessing IdPs in the same way as passwords are stolen
today, e.g. through phishing or Trojans. By also steal-
ing the InfoCards from the client platform, the attacker is
able to use those InfoCards and access the users’ services
without the users’ knowledge. This is done by tricking the
IdP into sending authentication assertions to SPs. In this
way attackers can thus misuse identities without actually
stealing them.
Microsoft’s motivation for trying to revive the cen-
tralised model of Passport through browser support is
clear. Acting as a transaction intermediary can provide
valuable information which be leveraged to allow new
business models. It will for example allow the IdP to col-
lect information about where actual transactions take place
on the Internet. By anonymising this information, it will
not necessarily represent a threat against user privacy.
4.5 The Federated SSO Identity Model
Federated identity models are based on groups of SPs that
enter into a mutual security and authentication agreement
in order to allow user SSO to their services. In the ter-
minology of the Liberty Alliance, these groups are called
circles of trust [9].
Identity federation can thus be dened as a set of
agreements, standards and technologies that enable SPs to
recognise user identities and entitlements from other SPs.
As in the silo identity model, each SP manages the
name space of all its users. Various silo identity domains
are then linked together to form a federated domain. In
practice, the different domain specic identiers of each
user are mapped, as illustrated in Fig.5. This makes it pos-
sible for different SPs to refer to the same user with dif-
ferent identiers, For authentication purposes, an SP will
accept a security assertion [10] from another SP claiming
that a given user has already been authenticated.
Figure 5: Federated user identity domains
The main advantage of the federated identity model is
that it provides SSO in open environments. The federated
model is compatible with, and can be retrotted to the
traditional silo model. SPs can thus keep existing name
spaces and authentication systems.
The main disadvantage is that it creates legal and tech-
nical complexity. For example, SPs are technically speak-
ing not able to distinguish between a security assertion
that reects a genuine user service request, or one that
represents a SP masquerading as a user. SPs must there-
fore trust security assertions from each other. In addition,
the mapping between identiers will technically speaking
allow SPs to correlate information about the same user,
which could represent a privacy threat. Users must there-
fore trust SPs to protect their privacy in this respect.
From a privacy perspective, a federated model can
be both an advantage and a disadvantage. Different SPs
within the same federation domain are technically able to
match personal information of the same user because of
the mapping between identiers. The privacy protection
thus depends on the privacy policy and the adherence to
the policy, which can pose a threat. On the other hand, a
user’s identity within a specic SP’s silo domain can be
anonymous, and only the home SP needs to know the
real world identity of the user. This can provide additional
privacy protection.
Similarly to having multiple centralised identity do-
mains as described in Sec.4.4, federated identity domains
can not solve the scalability problem for the users. By as-
suming that multiple federated identity domains will exist,
a user will most likely access SPs from different domains,
and will therefore have to authenticate with the respective
IdPs from each domain. The problem of password fatigue
will thus remain, illustrated by the multiple login requests
originating from the user in Fig.4, and this violates secu-
rity usability principle 1d. This is thus a model that can
provide SSO within each federated identity domain, but
not across multiple federated domains.
5 User-Centric User Identity Management
In this section we describe our approach to management of
user identities. It solves the scalability problem, and has
the potential of providing a universal SSO solution while
still being compatible with the other models described
in Sec.4 above. The user-centric approach also provides
stronger security than traditional solutions are able to pro-
vide.
This is achieved by having a separate hardware device
called PAD (Personal Authentication Device) that can take
active part in security of transactions, and that can store
identity information and authentication tokens.
It is important to distinguish between entity (user) au-
thentication, and message authentication. Entity authenti-
cation is when a subject entity proves the possession of an
authentication token when accessing a service which of-
ten is dened in terms of a session. This indicates that the
entity was present at some network access point at some
moment in time. However, it does not prove that the entity
is continuously present at the same access point during the
whole session, nor that every message that enters the net-
work through that access point originates from the user. It
is for example possible that the human user walks away
from the client terminal during an active session, and that
another person takes his place and sends access requests
from the session. It is also possible that a Trojan program
hiding on the client platform initiates activities from the
same session without the user even knowing.
In order to prevent hijacking of the session, i.e. session
activities that do not originating from the legitimate user,
message authentication is needed. This means that simple
user authentication is insufcient, and that the user must
authenticate every security critical message sent from the
client. This can be required for sensitive transactions such
as online banking, and many banks have already intro-
duced solutions for message authentication, as described
below.
5.1 SMS Authorisation Codes
Some banks issue special hardware tokens that can gen-
erate one-time authorisation codes, whereas other banks
rely on out-of-band communication to the customer’s mo-
bile phone. We describe the latter scenario below.
An interesting solution which has been implemented
by the National Australia Bank, is based on authorising
bank transactions using SMS messages sent to the user’s
mobile phone. Although the user has been authenticated
and is already logged in, this allows authentication of the
transaction request itself.
SMS messages sent from the bank to the user’s mobile
phone pass through the cellular network, and is indepen-
dent of the Internet. The user can manually transfer data
from the mobile phone to the client terminal. By verify-
ing the correct transfer of data from the mobile phone to
the client terminal, the bank can conclude that the user re-
ceived the data through the cellular network, read it and
submitted it through the Internet. This is then interpreted
as a genuine intent to submit the transaction. The secu-
rity of this scheme is based on the assumption that it is
difcult for an attacker to steal the user’s personal mobile
phone and to attack the cellular network. The scenario is
illustrated in Fig.6.
The SMS authorisation code is computed as a func-
tion of the origin and destination accounts, as well as the
Figure 6: Authorising bank transactions via SMS
Table 1: Messages in SMS bank security protocol
Msg ] Message description
1 Produce Login Id and authentication token
2 Transmit Login Id and authentication token
3 Verify Login Id and authentication token
4 Transmit service options
5 Present service options
6 Transaction request
7 Transmit transaction request
8 SMS message with authorisation code
9 Read SMS message
10 Verify amount and bank account number
11 Copy authorisation code
12 Transmit authorisation code
13 Verify authorisation code
14 Transmit transaction conrmation
15 Present transaction conrmation
amount. It typically consists of 8 digits which is the same
length as a normal telephone number, and can therefore
be copied manually from the mobile phone to the client
terminal without too much effort. A typical SMS message
as used in the scheme of National Australia Bank is illus-
trated in Fig.7.
Figure 7: Example SMS message with authorisation code
Assuming that an attacker changes the amount and/or
the destination account number, e.g. by a Trojan program
on the client terminal, the modied amount and account
number will appear in the SMS message. It is assumed
that the correctness of the amount and of the destination
account number is veried by the user when copying the
authorisation code from the SMS message. However, this
can be quite tedious and could therefore violate security
usability principle 2c and 2d. If a user victim fails to notice
that the bank account number in the SMS message is not
the same as the intended account number, and submits the
authorisation code through the client terminal, the attack
will succeed. Despite being the victim of an attack, the
liability could be put on the user because he accepted the
SMS message. The usability of SMS authorisation needs
to be investigated in order to determine whether the user
can be made liable for this type of attacks.
Assuming that the user is able verify the correctness
of the amount and of the bank account number in SMS
messages consistently and reliably, this scheme is secure
against attacks on the client terminal, and is in fact inde-
pendent of the security of the client terminal. This would
represent a considerable security improvement.
This scheme assumes that the mobile terminal can be
trusted, i.e. that no attacker is able to take over the control
of mobile terminals, in contrast to standard desktop client
terminals. If it were possible to take over the control of
the mobile terminal, an attacker could change the SMS
message, and present the expected amount and the bank
account number, so that the SMS message that the user
reads is not the same as the SMS message that the bank
sent.
The scheme also depends on the security of the mobile
phone networks, and it assumes that no attacker is able
to modify SMS messages sent to the user while in tran-
sit through the mobile network. Even if interception and
cryptanalysis of SMS messages sent over the air were pos-
sible, it requires that the the attacker is physically present
in the same base station coverage area, and this excludes
attacks from anywhere in the world.
5.2 User-Centric Silo Model
The user-centric model can be combined with any of
the traditional identity management models described in
Sec.4. Fig.8 illustrates the user-centric approach com-
bined with silo user identity domains. A user centric ap-
proach combined with e.g. federated identity domains
would also be meaningful.
Figure 8: User-centric identity model with silo domains
The user only needs to login to the PAD once. The
PAD is a single-user device, so no identier is needed.
Once logged in to the PAD, the user can access any ser-
vice, and the PAD does the login to each SP on the user’s
behalf. This can thus provide a universal SSO solution.
When combined with the silo model described in
Sec.4.1, the user-centric approach provides the same pri-
vacy protection as the silo model because exposure of per-
sonal information is limited to each SP with which the user
transacts. The user-centric approach can also be combined
with any other user identity model described above, and
will then inherit the privacy properties of these models.
From a usability point of view, the user-centric ap-
proach solves the scalability problem. All the identiers
and authentication tokens can be stored in the PAD, and
the PAD can also be congured to be directly integrated in
authentication protocols. Similarly to the SMS-based se-
curity solution described in Sec.5.1, the PAD can make the
security independent of the security of the client platform.
The term Personal Authentication Device has been in
use within the context of computer security at least since
1985 (Wong, et al., 1985). While the details of the oper-
ations and limitations of the devices have varied signi-
cantly since that time, the key concepts remain the same.
A more recent incarnation of the same concept can be
found in the form of the Personal Trusted Device dened
in the context of the Personal Transaction Protocol [11].
For all practical purposes, the PAD can be a mobile
phone or a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant). Because the
PAD provides a security service, it is crucial that the PAD
platform itself is secure.
The fundamental security problem with common com-
puting platforms such as Windows and Linux is that there
is no robust isolation of processes. Compromise of one ap-
plication often leads to the compromise of the whole plat-
form. This architecture, whereby processes can directly
access each other is considered a benet in a general pur-
pose computing platform because of the exibility it facil-
itates. For sensitive applications however, this architecture
is not appropriate.
It is likely that mobile manufacturers are tempted to
increase the exibility and connectivity of mobile phones
[12] in order to allow new business models. Unfortu-
nately this will necessarily lead to the introduction of se-
curity vulnerabilities and make such devices unsuitable as
PAD. Viruses for mobile phones are for example already
common [13]. It must be assumed that the PDA provides
strong isolation of processes, in which case it can be called
a trusted platform. If the PAD is combined with a mobile
phone, the functionality must be restricted in comparison
with many mobile phones that are currently on the market.
As indicated in Fig.8, the user needs to authenticate
to the PAD before it can authenticate to SPs. The PAD
can for example require two-factor authenticate through a
combination of PIN and biometrics, or through PIN and
a smartcard. Authentication to SPs will then actually be
three-factor because it also requires having the PAD itself.
The PAD should support multiple types of authentica-
tion tokens, and be integrable in different types of authen-
tication protocols. In its simplest form, the PAD could
simply store identiers and passwords that can be read by
the user and copied to login screens in the client platform.
More sophisticated solutions can directly involve the PAD
in the communication between SP and client. By letting
the PAD communicate directly with the SP it is possible
to design multi-channel security protocols.
6 SP Identity Management Models
In this section we will briey describe models for manag-
ing SP identities. The models will be seen from the point
of view of how different users can authenticate the same
SP.
6.1 Common SP Identifier Domain
The only widespread model for authenticating SPs on the
Internet is by having a common identity domain recog-
nised by all users. The name space of unique identiers
for SPs simply consists of all the Internet domain names.
The name space, together with the technology and organi-
sations that manage it, are commonly called the DNS (Do-
main Name System). The DNS forms a hierarchical tree
under the supervision of ICANN (Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers), where the authority for
each sub-domain manages the DNS directly underneath
it. Briey said, the DNS is the IdP in this model.
The authentication tokens consists of the so-called
server certicates, which are issued by CAs (Certicate
Authorities). The server certicates are also organised in
a hierarchical fashion, and the root certicate of each CA
is hard-coded and shipped with every Web browser. This
multi-hierarchy of server certicates can simply be called
the Browser PKI, and represents a common structure for
distributing authentication tokens to SPs.
The architecture for authenticating SPs is illustrated in
Fig.9.
Figure 9: The DNS identity domain and the browser PKI
The U.S. government acquired responsibility for, and
authority over the DNS root by virtue of its historical
initiative and nancial investment in supporting creation
of the Internet and the DNS. However, as the Internet
has become international in extent, support and operation,
the formal legitimacy of the U.S. government’s contin-
ued authority over the root has come under challenge[14],
such as in the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS)3
Although the approach illustrated in Fig.9 is based on
strong cryptography, it has been successfully attacked, e.g.
in the form of phishing attacks. This is due to the poor
usability of the Browser PKI and SSL security in general.
The SP identity authenticated by the client terminal is not
necessarily the same as the SP identity intended by the
user, and there is no simple way for the user to nd out
which SP the client in fact has authenticated.
6.2 User-Centric Management of SP Identities
Assuming that each user owns a PAD as described in
Sec.5.2, the users can create private identiers for SPs by
mapping the global unique identiers, such as a domain
name, to personally chosen identiers. This identier can
be anything that can be practically recognised, e.g. text,
pictures, logos and sound. This is illustrated in Fig.10.
Figure 10: User-centric approach to SP identity manage-
ment
Fig.10 shows the authentication protocol from a high
level of abstraction, and does for example not show the
communication between the user and the client terminal.
A more detailed scenario is described in Sec.7 below.
The index 4 of the identier indicates that it has been
assigned by the Domain Name Registrar 4, and the index
5 of the authentication token sent with the authentica-
tion messages of Fig.10 indicates that it has been issued by
CA 5. The authentication tokens are thus ordinary X.509
server certicates. The indexes 1, 2 and 3 of the SP
identiers in the personal domains indicate that these have
been assigned by the respective users.
The mapping between the global SP identier and the
personal SP identier takes place within the user domain.
To be practical, this requires the user terminal or PAD to
be directly involved in the authentication protocol in some
way. There are many ways of achieving this, and each
practical solution will depend on the type of device and
network connection.
3See http://www.itu.int/wsis/.
Figure 11: Mutual authentication scenario with PAD
The Mozilla TrustBar [15] is a software implementa-
tion of this concept. The TrustBar is a plug-in toolbar for
the Mozilla and Firefox browsers, where the user can store
images mapped to server certicates. Each time a server
certicate is successfully veried, the toolbar will check
if a mapping exists, and display the mapped image on the
toolbar while the corresponding page is loading.
The mapping between global and personal SP identi-
ers can also take place in a separate hardware device such
as the hardware PAD described in Sec.5.2. As an exam-
ple, assume that the PAD is embedded in a mobile phone,
and that the user accesses a service through the Internet
using an ordinary computer terminal. Mutual authentica-
tion between the SP and the user can now take place by
combining the IP channel with mobile channels. When
registering with the service, the user must specify through
which channels he wants authentication to take place. As-
suming that the user has assigned and mapped a private
SP identier in the form of an image or company logo to
the SP identier in the certicate, the PAD / mobile phone
can display the image on the screen when the certicate
has been veried by the PAD. Since the user chose the im-
age in the rst place, one can assume that the user is able
to recognise the same image when authenticating the SP
at a later stage.
This model effectively eliminates the phishing attack
threat, as illustrated with the following example. Assume
that the attacker has purchased a genuine certicate in or-
der for an SSL channel to be established, the SSL padlock
will be displayed on the browser window when access-
ing the attacker’s server. Assume that a user responds to
a spam email message by clicking on a URL pointing to
the attackers server, in the belief that it points to the gen-
uine server. Even if the certicate is correctly veried by
the browser or by the PAD, it will not be mapped to any-
thing, and the TrustBar or the PAD will give a warning,
and thereby indicate to the user that the Web site is un-
known.
7 Combining User and SP Identity Management
In the previous sections we have described how a user-
centric approach can be applied to the management of
both user identities and SP identities. The strength of the
user-centric approach becomes fully evident when both
are combined.
From a privacy perspective, the user centric approach
reduces to a minimum the number of parties to which per-
sonal information is disclosed. From a usability and secu-
rity perspective, the PAD can be used to personalise server
certicates so that they are more easily recognised.
A simple scenario can for example provide mutual au-
thentication based on the user-centric silo identity identity
model of Fig.8 and the user-centric common SP identity
model of Fig.10. This is illustrated in Fig.11. The mes-
sages of Fig.11 are described in Tab.2.
Table 2: Messages in mutual authentication protocol
Msg ] Message description
1 Specify service request
2 Transmit service request
3 Transmit server certicate
4 Establish SSL connection
5 Transmit login page
6 Present login page
7 Transmit server certicate to PAD
8 Verify server certicate
9 Play/display personalised certicate info
10 Verify correctness of personalised info
11 Accept SP
12 Transmit identier and authentication token
13 Transmit identier and authentication token
14 Verify identier and authentication token
15 Submit service page
16 Present service page
It is assumed that the user has already authenticated to
the PAD, and Msg.(11) “Accept SP” of Fig.11 does does
not require any password or other authentication token.
This is thus a SSO scheme, whereby the PAD automati-
cally transmits the user identier and authentication token
on behalf of the user.
7.1 Potentials of User-Centric Identity Management
By providing identity management assistance to users in
the form of a PAD, many authentication scenarios are pos-
sible. Fig.12 illustrates all the possible communication
channels that can be leveraged to create secure and user
friendly solutions.
Figure 12: Possible communication channels when using
a PAD for identity management
The topology of the graph in Fig.12 allows 4 sepa-
rate electronic communication paths between the user and
the SP. The authentication architecture based on SMS de-
scribed in Sec.5.1 uses only two of these paths. In addi-
tion, each communication link can be based on different
protocols and technology. The communication between
the PAD and the client terminal can for example take place
through a USB cable or via Bluetooth. This approach thus
opens up a large number of different architectures, and al-
lows multi-channel security protocols.
When designing security protocols, the computational
complexity of tasks to be executed by any of the nodes is
an important aspects. That is for example why public-key
encryption is never used for encrypting bulk data.
When human users form part of a security protocol,
similar considerations need to be made. More specically,
the mental load of the task to be performed by the human
user must be taken into account. Even if the load of a sin-
gle task is tolerable, the load of performing the same task
repeatedly must also be considered. The security usability
principles described in Sec.2 can be used as a guideline.
8 Conclusion
There will always be a trade-off between different goals
when designing identity management solutions, and it is
natural that the service and infrastructure providers pro-
mote solutions that seem immediately advantageous to
them. However these solutions are not necessarily ben-
ecial from the usability and privacy perspective, and this
in turn becomes a problem for all parties.
Our study has demonstrated that a user-centric ap-
proach to identity management has the greatest potential
of providing good usability combined with strong privacy
protection. By being compatible with legacy models, this
represents a good solution for all parties.
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